CHAPTER 7

IS A CARD LAID A CARD PLAYED?
INADVERTENT PRODUCTION AND INVASION OF PRIVILEGE

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MARK J. FUCILE of Fucile & Reising LLP handles professional responsibility, regulatory and attorney-client privilege issues for lawyers, law firms and corporate and governmental legal departments throughout the Northwest. Mark is the inaugural chair of the WSBA Committee on Professional Ethics and is a past chair of its predecessor, the WSBA Rules of Professional Conduct Committee. Mark is also a former member of the Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Committee and is a current member of the Idaho State Bar Section on Professionalism & Ethics. Mark writes the quarterly Ethics & the Law column for the WSBA NWLawyer, the monthly Ethics Focus column for the Multnomah (Portland) Bar’s Multnomah Lawyer and is a regular contributor on legal ethics to the WSBA NWSidebar blog. Mark is a contributing author/editor for the current editions of the WSBA Legal Ethics Deskbook, the WSBA Law of Lawyering in Washington and the OSB Ethical Oregon Lawyer. Before co-founding his firm in 2005, Mark was a partner and in-house ethics counsel for a large Northwest regional firm. He also teaches legal ethics as an adjunct for the University of Oregon School of Law at its Portland campus. Mark is admitted in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Alaska and the District of Columbia. He is a graduate of the UCLA School of Law.
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(Reprinted from Mark’s October 6, 2015 NWSidebar post)

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I. INADVERTENT PRODUCTION REVISITED (YET AGAIN)
(Reprinted from Mark’s March 2011 Ethics & the Law column for the
WSBA Bar News; available on the WSBA web site at www.wsba.org)

Few areas in the law of lawyering have seen as near constant evolution over the past 20
years as inadvertent production. Ironically, the principal reason is the equally constant evolution
of technology during that same period. When paper reigned supreme, courts were much less
forgiving of lawyers who inadvertently produced confidential communications that were labeled
plainly with law firm or general counsel letterhead. As communications between lawyers and
their clients moved increasingly to electronic form, however, it both increased the volume of
documents needing to be screened for privilege and made the screening process more difficult
and expensive. That technological change, in turn, has affected the development of the law of
inadvertent production on ethical duties, procedural rules and evidentiary privilege.

Over the past several years we have tracked the developments in the law of lawyering on
inadvertent production. Because significant changes have again occurred since we last visited
this area, it merits another look.

Ethical Duties

Before the Rules of Professional Conduct were amended in 2006, there was no specific
ethics rule governing inadvertent production. Instead, ethical duties were largely defined by a
series of American Bar Association formal and Washington State Bar Association informal
counseled that a lawyer receiving what appeared to be inadvertently produced privileged or
otherwise confidential materials from an opponent had a duty to notify the lawyer on the other
side. On the latter, WSBA Informal Ethics Opinion 1544 (1993) found no duty to notify but
Informal Ethics Opinion 1779 (1997) later adopted the ABA opinions on notification as the
preferred position.

In 2002 and 2003, the ABA amended its influential Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. That process produced a specific Model Rule, 4.4(b), and two accompanying
comments, Comment 2 and 3, on inadvertent production. The new rule directly addresses
notification: “A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s
client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall
promptly notify the sender.” Comment 2 leaves to procedural law whether any other actions are
necessary and leaves to evidence law whether privilege has been waived. Comment 3, in turn,
commits the voluntary return of inadvertently produced material to the receiving lawyer’s
discretion (again subject to procedural and evidentiary law). In light of these changes, the ABA
withdrew opinions 92-368 and 94-382 and replaced them with two new opinions, 05-437 (2005)
and 06-440 (2006), that essentially track Model Rule 4.4(b) and its comments.

Washington has seen a similar evolution in the duty to notify. When our RPCs were
amended in 2006, they included a new RPC 4.4(b) and new accompanying comments that are
identical to their ABA counterparts. RPC 4.4(b) applies both to Washington state court
proceedings and under, respectively, Western District General Rule 2(e) and Eastern District Local Rule 83.3(a), federal courts here as well.

Although RPC 4.4(b) is limited to notification, it offers the advantage of rule-based clarity. The initial ABA ethics opinions, by contrast, were cobbled together from a variety of analogous legal precepts—including the law of bailment (a rarely cited concept in ethics opinions). Further, when combined with the more recent procedural and evidentiary amendments discussed next, lawyers in both Washington’s federal and state courts now have a set of “bright line” rules to guide them through the matrix of issues raised by inadvertent production.

**Procedural Rules**

The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 2006 and the amendments to the Washington Civil Rules adopted in 2010 address the procedural mechanism for litigating possible privilege waiver through inadvertent production.

FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) now provides:

“If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.”

Amended CR 26(b)(6) closely follows its federal counterpart:

“If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has; must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved; and must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party disclosed it before being notified. Either party may promptly present the information in camera to the court for a determination of the claim. The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.”

FRCP 45(d)(2)(B) and CR 45(d)(2)(B) contain similar language in the context of subpoenas directed to third parties.

The emphasis on the courts—rather than the litigants—determining privilege waiver echoes earlier case law, including *In re Firestorm 1991*, 129 Wn.2d 130, 916 P.2d 411 (1996)*
(unauthorized contact with opposing party’s expert), and Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. 2001) (unauthorized use of privileged communications taken by client when he left adverse party). Firestorm and Richards also suggest the penalty for lawyers who use an opponent’s privileged material without first getting a ruling from a court that privilege has been waived: potential disqualification. The rationale for disqualification as a remedy is that simply returning the documents involved once they have been thoroughly analyzed and used isn’t enough. As Richards in particular emphasizes, the only way to “unring the bell” may be to remove the lawyers involved from the case altogether.

Evidentiary Privilege

Privilege waiver based on inadvertent production has also seen significant recent developments both nationally and in Washington.

Nationally, in September 2008 Federal Rule of Evidence 502 became law and creates specific criteria for waiver through inadvertent production. FRE 502 applies to all federal proceedings regardless of the basis for federal jurisdiction and binds state courts as well if a ruling in a federal case comes first. It applies to both the attorney-client privilege and the work product rule. FRE 502(b) is framed in the negative and finds that no waiver occurs if: “(1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following . . . [FRCP] 26(b)(5)(B).”

This past September, Washington adopted ER 502, which mirrors its federal counterpart and includes the same three factors for assessing waiver. The federal (FRE 502(e)) and the state (ER 502(e)) versions of the rule also encourage the use of so-called “claw back” agreements under which parties stipulate (either by direct agreement or through a stipulated court order) in advance to return inadvertently produced material.

The criteria for assessing waiver incorporated into the respective federal and state rules generally reflect the standards that a majority of courts had established through judicial decisions (see generally Banks v. United States, No. C03-5533RJB, 2005 WL 974723 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (unpublished) (compiling cases); Sitterson v. Evergreen School Dist. No. 114, 147 Wn. App. 576, 196 P.3d 735 (2008) (Division 2) (applying majority position)).

Summing Up

Collectively, the evolving ethics, procedural and evidence rules offer a much more cohesive approach to inadvertent production issues than in years past. Although any given case will continue to turn on its individual facts, the movement to a rule-based approach should provide relatively straightforward guidance as lawyers confront these issues with increasing frequency in an era where electronic communications now reign supreme.
II. APPEALS COURT CLARIFIES STANDARDS FOR IMPROPER ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED INFORMATION
(Reprinted from Mark’s October 6, 2015 NWSidebar post; available on the WSBA web site at www.wsba.org)

On September 14, Division I issued an important clarification on disqualification standards for improper access to an opponent’s privileged information in Foss Maritime Co. v. Brandewiede, ___ Wn. App. ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2015 WL 5330483 (2015). Foss was a commercial dispute over the renovation of a ship for the plaintiff by the defendant contractor. During the litigation, defense counsel contacted the plaintiff’s former project manager—who by that time had left the plaintiff. During the course of the interview, the former project manager gave the defense lawyer several emails he still had from his employment with the plaintiff—including some that contained attorney-client privileged communications. The defense lawyer later included them in a proposed trial exhibit. Before trial, the plaintiff moved to disqualify the defense lawyer based on the emails and possession of a “thumb drive” that the former project manager provided the defense lawyer in a second interview that also contained some privileged material. The plaintiff argued that the defense lawyer had improperly invaded privilege under RPC 4.4(a), which broadly prohibits a lawyer from violating the legal rights of another person.

The trial court reviewed the material in camera and disqualified the lawyer in a comparatively perfunctory order. On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Without reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not made adequate findings. Relying primarily on In re Firestorm 1991, 129 Wn.2d 130, 916 P.2d 411 (1996), the Court of Appeals found (at *6) that “any order of disqualification will require the consideration and analysis of (1) prejudice, (2) counsel’s fault, (3) counsel’s knowledge of privileged information, and (4) possible lesser sanctions.”

Foss highlights three important points. First, the factors the Court of Appeals identified should frame both sides of the briefing on disqualification motions that are based on asserted improper invasion of privilege. Although the lawyer conduct involved will remain at the heart of any disqualification motion, the Foss factors provide an analytical lenses for litigants and courts alike. Second, the Court of Appeals pointedly did not rule out disqualification in appropriate cases for improperly invading an opponent’s privilege. Richards v. Jain, 168 F. Supp.2d 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2001), which also relied on Firestorm 1991 and was cited by the Court of Appeals in Foss, is a dramatic example of how improper access can lead to disqualification. Third, lawyers should be mindful that in a discovery context, CR 26(b)(6), which was adopted in 2010 and is modeled on its federal counterpart, now requires a lawyer on the receiving end of what appears to be an opponent’s privileged information to notify the opponent and to seek the guidance of the court if contending that privilege does not apply or has been waived. The notification requirement is similar in this regard to RPC 4.4(b).
III. PRESENTATION SLIDES

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OVERVIEW
- RPC 4.4(b) and
  Inadvertent Production
- RPC 4.4(a) and
  Invasion of Privilege

Slide 3

LOGISTICS
- Materials
- Questions
RPC 4.4(b):
Inadvertent Production

- Old Times
  (When paper reigned supreme):
  “Finders Keepers, Losers Weepers”

- New Times
  (When email reigns supreme):
  “Gold Nugget or Rotten Egg?”

RPC 4.4(b):
The Rule

“A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”

RPC 4.4(b):
Comment 2 (in part)

“If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged status of a document has been waived.”
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RPC 4.4(b):
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- **Ethics**: Do we have to notify?
- **Procedure**: How do we raise waiver?
- **Evidence**: Has privilege been waived?

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RPC 4.4(b):
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The way it was....

- ABA Ethics Opinions 92-368 & 94-382
- State counterparts

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RPC 4.4(b):
Ethics
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(ABA 2002 amendments and
Washington 2006 amendments)

- RPC 4.4(b)
  - Duty to notify
  - Litigating waiver left to procedural law
  - Waiver left to evidence law

- ABA Ethics Opinions 05-437 & 06-440
RPC 4.4(b):
Procedure
The way it is now....
(FRCP 2006 amendments and
Washington CR 2010 amendments)

- FRCP 26(b)(5)(B) & CR 26(b)(6)
  - Return/destroy/sequester
  - Don’t use until waiver resolved
  - Can file under seal for waiver review
  - Now encourages “claw back” agreements

RPC 4.4(b):
Evidence
The way it is now....
(FRE 2008 amendments and
Washington ER 2010 amendments)

- FRE 502(b) & ER 502(b)
  - Disclosure is inadvertent
  - Reasonable steps to prevent disclosure
  - Reasonable steps to rectify

RPC 4.4(a):
Invasion of Privilege

- Disqualification risk to the recipient
- Exclusion of any improperly obtained evidence
RPC 4.4(a): The Rule

“...a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” (Emphasis added.)

RPC 4.4(a): The Cases


QUESTIONS?